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Abstract. In the recent quest for trustworthy neural networks, we present
Spiking Neural Network (SNN) as a potential candidate for inherent ro-
bustness against adversarial attacks. In this work, we demonstrate that
adversarial accuracy of SNNs under gradient-based attacks is higher than
their non-spiking counterparts for CIFAR datasets on deep VGG and
ResNet architectures, particularly in blackbox attack scenario. We at-
tribute this robustness to two fundamental characteristics of SNNs and
analyze their effects. First, we exhibit that input discretization intro-
duced by the Poisson encoder improves adversarial robustness with re-
duced number of timesteps. Second, we quantify the amount of adver-
sarial accuracy with increased leak rate in Leaky-Integrate-Fire (LIF)
neurons. Our results suggest that SNNs trained with LIF neurons and
smaller number of timesteps are more robust than the ones with IF
(Integrate-Fire) neurons and larger number of timesteps. Also we over-
come the bottleneck of creating gradient-based adversarial inputs in tem-
poral domain by proposing a technique for crafting attacks from SNN1.
Keywords: Spiking Neural Networks, Adversarial attack, Leaky-Integrate-
Fire neuron, Input discretization
1 Introduction
Adversarial attack is one of the biggest challenges against the success of to-
day’s deep neural networks in mission critical applications [16], [10], [32]. The
underlying concept of an adversarial attack is to purposefully modulate the in-
put to a neural network such that it is subtle enough to remain undetectable
to human eyes, yet capable of fooling the network into incorrect decisions. This
malicious behavior was first demonstrated in 2013 by Szegedy et. al. [27] and
Biggio et. al. [4] in the field of computer vision and malware detection, respec-
tively. Since then, numerous defense mechanisms have been proposed to address
1 https://github.com/ssharmin/spikingNN-adversarial-attack
ar
X
iv
:2
00
3.
10
39
9v
2 
 [c
s.C
V]
  2
3 J
ul 
20
20
2 S. Sharmin et. al.
this issue. One category of defense includes fine-tuning the network parameters
like adversarial training [11], [18], network distillation [22], stochastic activation
pruning [8] etc. Another category focuses on preprocessing the input before pass-
ing through the network like thermometer encoding [5], input quantization [31],
[21], compression [12] etc. Unfortunately, most of these defense mechanisms have
been proved futile by many counter-attack techniques. For example, an ensemble
of defenses based on “gradient-masking” collapsed under the attack proposed in
[1]. Defensive distillation was broken by Carlini-Wagner method [6], [7]. Adver-
sarial training has the tendency to overfit to the training samples and remain
vulnerable to transfer attacks [28]. Hence, the threat of adversarial attack con-
tinues to persist.
In the absence of adversarial robustness in the existing state-of-the-art networks,
we feel there is a need for a network with inherent susceptibility against adver-
sarial attacks. In this work, we present Spiking Neural Network (SNN) as a po-
tential candidate due to two of its fundamental distinctions from the non-spiking
networks:
1. SNNs operate based on discrete binary data (0/1), whereas their non-spiking
counterparts, referred as Analog Neural Network (ANN), take in continuous-
valued analog signals. Since SNN is a binary spike-based model, input dis-
cretization is a constituent element of the network, most commonly done by
Poisson encoding.
2. SNNs employ nonlinear activation function of the biologically inspired Integrate-
Fire (IF) or Leaky-Integrate-Fire (LIF) neurons, in contrast to the piecewise-
linear ReLU activations used in ANNs.
Among the handful of works done in the field of SNN adversarial attacks [19],
[2], most of them are restricted to either simple datasets (MNIST) or shallow
networks. However, this work extends to complex datasets (CIFAR) as well as
deep SNNs which can achieve comparable accuracy to the state-of-the-art ANNs
[24], [23]. For robustness comparison with non-spiking networks, we analyze two
different types of spiking networks: (1) converted SNN (trained by ANN-SNN
conversion [24]) and (2) backpropagated SNN (an ANN-SNN converted network,
further incrementally trained by surrogate gradient backpropagation [23]). We
identify that converted SNNs fail to demonstrate more robustness than ANNs.
Although authors in [25] show similar analysis, we explain with experiments the
reason behind this discrepancy and, thereby, establish the necessary criteria for
an SNN to become adversarially robust. Moreover, we propose an SNN-crafted
attack generation technique with the help of the surrogate gradient method. We
summarize our contribution as follows:
• We show that the adversarial accuracies of SNNs are higher than ANNs
under a gradient-based blackbox attack scenario, where the respective clean
accuracies are comparable to each other. The attacks were performed on
deep VGG and ResNet architectures trained on CIFAR10 and CIFAR100
datasets. For whitebox attacks, the comparison is dependent on the relative
strengths of the adversary.
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• The increased robustness of SNN is attributed to two fundamental charac-
teristics: input discretization through Poisson encoding and non-linear acti-
vations of LIF (or IF) neurons.
◦ We investigate how adversarial accuracy changes with the number of
timesteps (inference latency) used in SNN for different levels of input
pre-quantization2. In case of backpropagated SNNs (trained with smaller
number of timesteps), the amount of discretization as well as adver-
sarial robustness increases as we reduce the number of timesteps. Pre-
quantization of the analog input brings about further improvement.
However, converted SNNs appear to depend only on the input pre-
quantization, but invariant to the variation in the number of timesteps.
Since these converted SNNs operate under larger number of timesteps
[24], discretization effect is minimized by input averaging, and hence, the
observed invariance.
◦ We show that piecewise-linear activation (ReLU) in ANN linearly prop-
agates the adversarial perturbation throughout the network, whereas
LIF (or IF) neurons diminish the effect of perturbation at every layer.
Additionally, the leak factor in LIF neurons offers an extra knob to con-
trol the adversarial perturbation. We perform a quantitative analysis to
demonstrate the effect of leak on the adversarial robustness of SNNs.
Overall, we show that SNNs employing LIF neurons, trained with surrogate
gradient-based backpropagation, and operating at less number of timesteps
are more robust than SNNs trained with ANN-SNN conversion that requires
IF neurons and more number of timesteps. Hence, the training technique
plays a crucial role in fulfilling the prerequisites for an adversarially robust
SNN.
• Gradient-based attack generation in SNNs is non-trivial due to the discon-
tinuous gradient of the LIF (or IF) neurons. We propose a methodology to
generate attacks based on the approximate surrogate gradients.
2 Background
2.1 Adversarial Attack
Given a clean image x belonging to class i and a trained neural network M , an
adversarial image xadv needs to meet two criteria:
1. xadv is visually “similar” to x i. e. |x−xadv| = , where  is a small number.
2. xadv is misclassified by the neural network, i. e. M(xadv) 6= i
The choice of the distance metric |.| depends on the method used to create xadv
and  is a hyper-parameter. In most methods, l2 or l∞ norm is used to measure
the similarity and the value of  is limited to ≤ 8255 where normalized pixel
intensity x ∈ [0, 1] and original x ∈ [0, 255].
In this work, we construct adversarial examples using the following two methods:
2 Full-precision analog inputs are quantized to lower bit precision values before un-
dergoing the discretization process by the Poisson encoder of SNN
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Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) This is one of the simplest methods
for constructing adversarial examples, introduced in [11]. For a given instance x,
true label ytrue and the corresponding cost function of the network J(x, ytrue),
this method aims to search for a perturbation δ such that it maximizes the
cost function for the perturbed input J(x + δ, ytrue), subject to the constraint
|δ|∞ < . In closed form, the attack is formulated as,
xadv = x+ × sign
(∇xJ (x, ytrue) ) (1)
Here,  denotes the strength of the attack.
Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) This method, proposed in [18], pro-
duces more powerful adversary. PGD is basically a k-step variant of FGSM
computed as,
x
(k+1)
adv = Πx+
{(
x
(k)
adv + α× sign
(
∇x
(
J(x
(k)
adv, ytrue)
)))}
(2)
where x
(0)
adv = x and α(≤ ) refers to the amount of perturbation used per itera-
tion or step, k is the total number of iterations. Πx+{.} performs a projection of
its operand on an -ball around x, i. e., the operand is clipped between x+ and
x− . Another variant of this method adds a random perturbation of strength 
to x before performing PGD operation.
2.2 Spiking Neural Network (SNN)
The main difference between an SNN and an ANN is the concept of time. The
incoming signals as well as the intermediate node inputs/outputs in an ANN
are static analog values, whereas in an SNN, they are binary spikes with a
value of 0 or 1, which are also functions of time. In the input layer, a Poisson
event generation process is used to convert the continuous valued analog signals
into binary spike train. Suppose the input image is a 3-D matrix of dimension
h×w × l with pixel intensity in the range [0, 1]. At every time step of the SNN
operation, a random number (from the normal distribution N (0, 1)) is generated
for each of these pixels. A spike is triggered at that particular time step if the
corresponding pixel intensity is greater than the generated random number. This
process continues for a total of T timesteps to produce a spike train for each
pixel. Hence, the size of the input spike train is T ×h×w× l. For a large enough
T , the timed average of the spike train will be proportional to its analog value.
Every node of the SNN is accompanied with a neuron. Among many neuron
models, the most commonly used ones are Integrate-Fire (IF) or Leaky-Integrate-
Fire (LIF) neurons. The dynamics of the neuron membrane potential at time t+1
is described by,
V (t+ 1) = λV (t) +
∑
i
wixi(t) (3)
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Here λ = 1 for IF neurons and < 1 for LIF neurons. wi denotes the synaptic
weight between current neuron and i-th pre-neuron. xi(t) is the input spike from
the i-th pre-neuron at time t. When V (t+ 1) reaches the threshold voltage Vth,
an output spike is generated and the membrane potential is reset to 0, or in
case of soft reset, reduced by the amount of the threshold voltage. At the output
layer, inference is performed based on the cumulative membrane potential of the
output neurons after the total time T has elapsed.
One of the main shortcomings of SNNs is that they are difficult to train, es-
pecially for deeper networks. Since the neurons in an SNN have discontinuous
gradients, standard gradient-descent techniques do not directly apply. In this
work, we use two of the supervised training algorithms [24], [23], which achieve
ANN-like accuracy even for deep neural networks and on complex datasets.
ANN-SNN Conversion This training algorithm was originally outlined in [9]
and subsequently improved in [24] for deep networks. Note that the algorithm
is suited for training SNNs with IF neurons only. They propose a threshold-
balancing technique that sequentially tunes the threshold voltage of each layer.
Given a trained ANN, the rst step is to generate the input Poisson spike train
for the network over the training set for a large enough time-window so that
the timed average accurately describes the input. Next, the maximum value of∑
i wixi (term 2 in Eq. 3) received by layer 1 is recorded over the entire time
range for several minibatches of the training data. This is referred as the maxi-
mum activation for layer 1. The threshold value of layer 1 neuron is replaced by
this maximum activation keeping the synaptic weights unchanged. Such thresh-
old tuning operation ensures that the IF neuron activity precisely mimics the
ReLU function in the corresponding ANN. After balancing layer 1 threshold, the
method is continued for all subsequent layers sequentially.
LIF
u o
uVt
𝜕𝑜
𝜕𝑢
Τ𝜕𝑜 𝜕𝑢
Linear
Exp
Fig. 1. Surrogate gradient
approximation of an LIF
neuron.
Conversion & Surrogate-Gradient Backprop-
agation In order to take advantage of the standard
backpropagation-based optimization procedures, au-
thors in [3], [33], [30] introduced the surrogate gra-
dient technique. The input-output characteristics of
an LIF (or IF) neuron is a step function, the gradi-
ent of which is discontinuous at the threshold point
(Fig. 1). In surrogate gradient technique, the gradi-
ent is approximated by pseudo-derivatives like linear
or exponential functions. Authors in [23] proposed a
novel approximation function for these gradients by
utilizing the spike time information in the derivative.
The gradient at timestep t is computed as follows:
∂ot
∂ut
= αe−β∆t (4)
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Here, ot is the output spike at time t, ut is the membrane potential at t, ∆t
is the difference between current timestep and the last timestep post-neuron
generated a spike. α and β are hyperparameters. Once the neuron gradients are
approximated, backpropagation through time (BPTT) [29] is performed using
the chain rule of derivatives. In BPTT, the network is unrolled over all timesteps.
The final output is computed as the cumulation of outputs at every timestep and
eventually, loss is defined on the summed output. During backward propagation
of the loss, the gradients are accumulated over time and used in gradient-descent
optimization. Authors in [23] proposed a hybrid training procedure in which the
surrogate-gradient training is preceded by an ANN-SNN conversion to initialize
the weights and thresholds of the network. The advantage of this method over
ANN-SNN conversion is twofold: one can train a network with both IF and LIF
neurons and the number of timesteps required for training is reduced by a factor
of 10 without losing accuracy.
3 Experiments
3.1 Dataset and Models
We conduct our experiments on VGG5 and ResNet20 for CIFAR10 dataset and
VGG11 for CIFAR100. The network topology for VGG5 consists of conv3,64-
avgpool-conv3,128 (×2)-avgpool-fc1024 (×2)-fc10. Here conv3,64 refers to a con-
volutional layer with 64 output filters and 3×3 kernel size. fc1024 is a fully-
connected layer with 1024 output neurons. VGG11 contains 11 weight layers
corresponding to the configuration A in [26] with maxpool layers replaced by
average pooling. ResNet20 follows the proposed architecture for CIFAR10 in
[13], except the initial 7 × 7 non-residual convolutional layer is replaced by a
series of two 3× 3 convolutional layers. For ANN-SNN conversion of ResNet20,
threshold balancing is performed only on these initial non-residual units (as
demonstrated by [24]). The neurons (in both ANN and SNN) contain no bias
terms, since they have an indirect effect on the computation of threshold voltages
during ANN-SNN conversion. The absence of bias eliminates the use of batch
normalization [14] as a regularizer. Instead, a dropout layer is used after every
ReLU (except for those which are followed by a pooling layer).
3.2 Training Procedure
The aim of our experiment is to compare adversarial attack on 3 networks: 1)
ANN, 2) SNN trained by ANN-SNN conversion and 3) SNN trained by back-
propagation, with initial conversion. These networks will be referred as ANN,
SNN-conv and SNN-BP, respectively from this point onward.
For both CIFAR10 and CIFAR100 datasets, we follow the data augmentation
techniques in [17]: 4 pixels are padded on each side, and a 32×32 crop is ran-
domly sampled from the padded image or its horizontal ip. Testing is performed
on the original 32 × 32 images. Both training and testing data are normalized
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to [0, 1]. For training the ANNs, we use cross-entropy loss with stochastic gra-
dient descent optimization (weight decay=0.0001, mometum=0.9). VGG5 (and
ResNet20) are trained for a total of 200 epochs, with an initial learning rate of
0.1 (0.05), which is divided by 10 at 100-th (80-th) and 150-th (120-th) epoch.
VGG11 with CIFAR100 is trained for 250 epochs with similar learning sched-
ule. During training SNN-conv networks, a total of 2500 timesteps are used for
all VGG and ResNet architectures. SNN-BP networks are trained for 15 epochs
with cross-entropy loss and adam [15] optimizer (weight decay=0.0005). Initial
learning rate is 0.0001, which is halved every 5 epochs. A total of 100 timesteps is
used for VGG5 and 200 timesteps for ResNet20 & VGG11. Training is performed
with either linear surrogate gradient approximation [3] or spike time dependent
approximation [23] with α = 0.3, β=0.01 (in Eq. 4). Both techniques yield ap-
proximately similar results. Leak factor λ is kept at 0.99 in all cases, except in
the analysis for the leak effect.
In order to analyze the effect of input quantization (with varying number of
timesteps) and leak factors, only VGG5 networks with CIFAR10 dataset is used.
3.3 Adversarial Input Generation Methodology
For the purpose of whitebox attacks, we need to construct adversarial samples
from all three networks (ANN, SNN-conv, SNN-BP). The ANN-crafted FGSM
and PGD attacks are generated using the standard techniques described in Eq. 1
and 2, respectively. We carry out non-targeted attacks with  = 8/255. PGD
attacks are performed with iteration steps k = 7 and per-step perturbation
α = 2/255. FGSM or PGD method cannot be directly applied to SNN due to its
discontinuous gradient problem (described in Sec. 2.2). To that end, we outline a
surrogate-gradient based FGSM (and PGD) technique. In SNN, analog input X
is converted to Poisson spike train Xspike which is fed into the 1st convolutional
layer. If Xrate is the timed average of Xspike, the membrane potential of the 1st
convolutional layer Xconv1 can be approximated as
Xconv1 ≈ Conv(Xrate,Wconv1) (5)
Wconv1 is the weight of the 1st convolutional layer. From this equation, the sign
of the gradient of the network loss function J w.r.t. Xrate or X is described by
(detailed derivation is provided in supplementary),
sign
( ∂J
∂X
)
≈ sign
( ∂J
∂Xrate
)
= sign
(
Conv
( ∂J
∂Xconv1
,W 180rotatedconv1
))
(6)
Surrogate gradient technique yields ∂J∂Xconv1 from SNN, which is plugged into
Eq. 6 to calculate the sign of the input gradient. This sign matrix is later used
to compute Xadv according to standard FGSM or PGD method. The algorithm
is summarized in 1.
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Algorithm 1 SNN-crafted Xadv : FGSM
Require: Input (X, ytrue), Trained SNN (N) with loss function J.
Ensure: ∂J
∂Xconv1
← 0
for timestep t in total time T do
forward: Loss J(X, ytrue)
backward : Accumulate gradient ∂J
∂Xconv1
+ = Xconv1.grad
end for
post-processing: sign( ∂J
∂X
) = sign
(
Conv( ∂J
∂Xconv1
,W 180rotatedconv1 )
)
SNN-crafted adversary: XSNNadv = X + × sign( ∂J∂X )
4 Results
4.1 ANN vs SNN
Table 1 summarizes our results for CIFAR10 (VGG5 & ResNet20) and CI-
FAR100 (VGG11) datasets in whitebox and blackbox settings. For each archi-
tecture, we start with three networks: ANN, SNN-conv and SNN-BP, trained
to achieve comparable baseline clean accuracy. Let us refer them as MANN ,
MSNN-conv and MSNN-BP , respectively. During blackbox attack, we generate
an adversarial test dataset xadv from a separately trained ANN of the same
network topology as the target model but different initialization. It is clear that
the adversarial accuracy of SNN-BP during FGSM and PGD blackbox attacks
is higher than the corresponding ANN and SNN-conv models, irrespective of the
size of the dataset or network architecture (the highest value of the accuracy for
each attack case is highlighted by orange text). The amount of improvement in
adversarial accuracy, compared to ANN, is listed as ∆ in the Table. If MANN and
MSNN-BP yield adversarial accuracy of pANN% and pSNN-BP%, respectively,
the value of ∆ amounts to pSNN-BP% − pANN%. On the other hand, during
whitebox attack, we generate three sets of adversarial test dataset: xadv,ANN
(generated from MANN ), xadv,SNN-conv (generated from MSNN-conv) and so
on. Since ANN and SNN have widely different operating dynamics and con-
stituent elements, the strength of the constructed adversary varies significantly
from ANN to SNN during whitebox attack (demonstrated in Sec. 4.2). SNN-BP
shows significant improvement in whitebox adversarial accuracy (∆ ranging from
2% to 4.6%) for both VGG and Resnet architectures with CIFAR10 dataset. In
contrast, VGG11 ANN with CIFAR100 manifests higher whitebox accuracy than
SNN-BP. We attribute this discrepancy to the difference in adversary-strength
of ANN & SNN for different dataset and network architectures. From Table 1,
it is evident that SNN-BP networks exhibit the highest amount of adversarial
accuracy (orange text) among the three networks in all blackbox attack cases
(attacked by a common adversary), whereas SNN-conv and ANN demonstrate
comparable accuracy, irrespective of the dataset, network topology or attack
generation method. Hence, we conclude that SNN-BP is inherently more robust
compared to their non-spiking counterpart as well as SNN-conv models, when
all three networks are attacked by identical adversarial inputs. It is important to
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Table 1. A comparison of the clean and adversarial (FGSM and PGD) test accuracy
(%) among ANN, SNN-conv and SNN-BP networks. Highest value of the accuracy for
each attack case is marked in orange text. FGSM accuracy is calculated at  = 8/255.
For PGD,  = 8/255, α (per-step perturbation) = 2/255, k (number of steps) = 7. The
blackbox attacks are generated from a separately trained ANN of the same network
topology as the target model but different initialization
Whitebox Blackbox
ANN SNN-
conv
SNN-
BP
∆† ANN SNN-
conv
SNN-
BP
∆†
CIFAR10
V
G
G
5 Clean 90% 89.9% 89.3% — 90% 89.9% 89.3% —
FGSM 10.4% 7.7% 15% 4.6% 18.9% 19.3% 21.5% 2.6%
PGD 1.8% 1.7% 3.8% 2.0% 9.3% 9.6% 16.0% 6.7%
R
es
N
et
2
0 Clean 88.0% 87.5% 86.1% — 88.0% 87.5% 86.1% —
FGSM 28.9% 28.8% 31.3% 2.4% 56.7% 56.8% 56.8% 0.1%
PGD 1.9% 1.4% 4.9% 3.0% 41.5% 41.6% 46.5% 5.0%
CIFAR100
V
G
G
1
1 Clean 67.1% 66.8% 64.4% — 67.1% 66.8% 64.4% —
FGSM 17.1% 10.5% 15.5% -1.6% 21.2% 21.4% 21.4% 0.2%
PGD 8.5% 4.1% 6.3% -2.2% 15.6% 15.8% 16.5% 0.9%
†∆ = Adversarial accuracy (SNN-BP) - Adversarial accuracy (ANN)
mention here that our conclusion is validated for VGG & ResNet architectures
and gradient-based attacks only.
In the next two subsections, we explain two characteristics of SNNs contributing
towards this robustness, as well as the reason for SNN-conv not being able to
show similar behavior.
Effect of input quantization and number of timesteps The main idea
behind non-linear input pre-processing as a defense mechanism is to discretize
continuous-valued input signals so that the network becomes non-transparent to
adversarial perturbations, as long as they lie within the discretization bin. SNN
is a binary spike-based network, which demands encoding any analog valued
input signal into binary spike train, and hence, we believe it has the inherent
robustness. In our SNN models, we employ Poisson rate encoding, where the out-
put spike rate is proportional to the input pixel intensity. However, the amount
of discretization introduced by the Poisson encoder varies with the number of
timesteps used. Hence, the adversarial accuracy of the network can be controlled
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Fig. 2. Blackbox FGSM accuracy(%) versus total number of timesteps (T ) plot with
4-bit (blue) and 2-bit (orange) input quantization for (a) SNN-BP and (b) SNN-conv
networks. SNN-BP adversarial accuracy increases drastically with decreased number
of timesteps, whereas SNN-conv is insensitive to it. (c) A table summarizing the clean
accuracy of ANN, SNN-conv and SNN-BP for different input quantizations and number
of timesteps.
by varying the number of timesteps as long as the clean accuracy remains within
reasonable limit. This effect can be further enhanced by quantizing the analog
input before feeding into the Poisson encoder. In Fig. 2(a), we demonstrate the
FGSM adversarial accuracy of an SNN-BP network (VGG5) trained for 50, 75,
100 and 150 timesteps with CIFAR10 dataset. As number of timesteps drop
from 150 to 50, accuracy increases by ∼ 5% (blue line) for 4-bit input quantiza-
tion. Note that clean accuracy drops by only 1.4% within this range, from 88.9%
(150 timesteps) to 87.5% (50 timesteps), as showed in the table in Fig. 2(c).
Additional reduction of the number of timesteps leads to larger degradation of
clean accuracy. The adversarial accuracy for corresponding ANN (with 4-bit in-
put quantization) is showed in gray triangle in the same plot for comparison.
Further increase in adversarial accuracy is obtained by pre-quantizing the ana-
log inputs to 2-bits (orange line) and it follows the same trend with number of
timesteps. Thus varying the number of timesteps introduces an extra knob for
controlling the level of discretization in SNN-BP in addition to the input pre-
quantizations. In contrast, in Fig. 2(b), similar experiments performed on SNN-
conv network demonstrate little increase in adversarial accuracy with the number
of timesteps. Only pre-quantization of input signal causes improvement of ac-
curacy from ∼ 21% to ∼ 28%. Note that the range of the number of timesteps
used for SNN-conv (300 to 2000) is much higher than SNN-BP, because con-
verted networks have higher inference latency. The reason behind the invariance
of SNN-conv towards the number of timesteps is explained in Fig. 3. We plot the
input-output characteristics of the Poisson-encoder for 4 cases: (b) 4-bit input
quantization with smaller number of timesteps (50 and 150), (c) 4-bit quanti-
zation, larger number of timesteps (300 and 2000) and their 2-bit counterparts
in (d) and (e), respectively. It is evident from (c) and (e) that larger number of
timesteps introduces more of an averaging effect, than quantization, and hence,
varying the number of timesteps has negligible effect on the transfer plots (solid
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Fig. 3. The input-output characteristics of Poisson encoder to demonstrate the effect
of the total number of timseteps T used to generate the spike train with different levels
of pre-quantization of the analog input. When T is in the low value (between 50 to
150) regime (subplots (b) and (d)), the amount of quantization significantly changes
for varying the number of timesteps (solid dotted and dashed lines). But in the high
value regime of T (plots (c) and (e)), solid dotted and dashed lines almost coincide due
to the averaging effect. The flow of data from output y to input x is showed in the
schematic in (a)
dotted and dashed lines coincide), which is not true for (b) and (d). Due to this
averaging effect, Poisson output y for SNN-conv tends to follow the trajectory
of xquant (quantized ANN input), leading to comparable adversarial accuracy
to the corresponding ANN over the entire range of timesteps in Fig. 2(b). Note
that, in these plots input x refers to the analog input signal, whereas output y
is the timed average of the spike train (as showed in the schematic in Fig. 3(a)).
Effect of LIF (or IF) neurons and the leak factor Another major con-
tributing factor towards SNN robustness is their highly nonlinear neuron ac-
tivations (Integrate-Fire or Leaky-Integrate-Fire), whereas ANNs use mostly
piecewise linear activations like ReLU. In order to explain the effect of this
nonlinearity, we perform a proof of concept experiment. We feed a clean and
corresponding adversarial input to a ReLU and an LIF neuron (λ = 0.99 in
Eq. 3). Both of the inputs are 32 × 32 images with pixel intensity normalized
to [0, 1]. Row 1, 2 and 3 in Fig. 4 present the clean image, corresponding ad-
versarial image and their absolute difference (amount of perturbation), respec-
tively. Note, the outputs of the LIF neurons are binary at each timestep, hence,
we take an average over the entire time-window to obtain corresponding pixel
intensity. ReLU passes both clean and adversarial inputs without any transfor-
mation, hence the l2-norm of the perturbation is same at the input and ReLU
output (bottom table of the figure). However, the non-linear transformation in
LIF reduces the perturbation of 0.6 at input layer to 0.3 at its output. Basi-
cally, the output images of LIF (column 3) neurons is a low pixel version of
the input images, due to the translation of continuous analog values into a bi-
nary spike representation. This behavior helps diminish the propagation of ad-
versarial perturbation through the network. IF neurons also demonstrate this
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Fig. 4. The input and output of ReLU and LIF neurons for each of clean and adversarial
image. Column 1 shows clean image, adversarial image and the absolute value of the
adversarial perturbation before passing through the neurons. Column 2 and 3 depict
the corresponding images after passing through a ReLU and an LIF, respectively. The
bottom table contains the l2-norm of the perturbation at the input, ReLU output and
LIF output
non-linear transformation. However, the quantization effect is minimized due to
their operation over longer time-window (as explained in the previous section).
𝑡 = 1, 𝑉1 = 𝑉𝑚𝑒𝑚
𝑡 = 2, 𝑉2 = 𝜆𝑉𝑚𝑒𝑚 + 𝑉𝑚𝑒𝑚
= (1 + 𝜆) 𝑉𝑚𝑒𝑚
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Fig. 5. Output of an LIF neuron for con-
stant input voltage.
Unlike SNN-conv, SNN-BP networks
can be trained with LIF neurons. The
leak factor in an LIF neuron provides
an extra knob to manipulate the adver-
sarial robustness of these networks. In
order to investigate the effect of leak on
the amount of robustness, we develop a
simple expression relating the leak fac-
tor with neuron spike rate in an LIF
neuron. In this case, the membrane po-
tential Vt at timestep t is updated as
Vt = λVt−1 + Vinput,t given the mem-
brane potential has not reached thresh-
old yet, and hence, reset signal = 0.
Here, λ (< 1) is the leak factor and Vinput,t is the input to the neuron at timestep
t. Let us consider the scenario, where a constant voltage Vmem is fed into the
neuron at every timestep and the membrane potential reaches the threshold volt-
age Vth after n timesteps. As explained in Fig. 5, membrane potential follows
a geometric progression with time. After replacing VthVmem with a constant r, we
obtain the following relation between the rate of spike (1/n) and leak factor (λ):
Spike rate,
1
n
=
logλ
log[rλ− (r − 1)] , λ < 1 (7)
In Fig. 6(a), we plot the spike rate as a function of leak factor λ for different
values of Vmem according to Eq. 7, where λ is varied from 0.9999 to 0.75. In
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Fig. 6. (a) Spike rate versus leak factor λ for different values of Vmem
Vth
. Smaller value
of λ corresponds to more leak. (b) A bar plot showing the comparison of clean, FGSM
and PGD( = 8/255) accuracy for a VGG5 SNN-BP network trained on CIFAR10 for
different values of λ. These are blackbox attacks crafted from a VGG5 ANN model
every case, spike rate decreases (i. e. sparsity and hence, robustness increases)
with increased amount of leak (smaller λ). The plot in Fig. 6(b) justifies this
idea where we show the adversarial accuracy of an SNN-BP network (VGG5
with CIFAR10) trained with different values of leak. For both FGSM and PGD
attacks, adversarial accuracy increases by 3 ∼ 6% as λ is decreased to 0.95. Note,
the clean accuracy of the trained SNNs with different leak factors lies within a
range of ∼ 2%. In addition to sparsity, leak makes the membrane potential
(in turn, the output spike rate) dependent on the temporal information of the
incoming spike train [20]. Therefore, for a given input, while the IF neuron
produces a deterministic spike pattern, the input-output spike mapping is non-
deterministic in an LIF neuron. This effect gets enhanced with increased leak.
We assume that this phenomenon is also responsible to some extent for the
increased robustness of backpropagated SNNs with increased leak. It is worth
mentioning here that Eq. 7 holds when input to the neuron remains unchanged
with the leak factor. In our experiments, we train SNN-BP with different values
of λ starting from the same initialized ANN-SNN converted network. Hence, the
parameters of SNN-BP trained with different leak factors do not vary much from
one another. Therefore, the assumption in the equation applies to our results.
4.2 ANN-Crafted vs SNN-Crafted Attack
Lastly, we propose an attack-crafting technique from SNN with the aid of the
surrogate gradient calculation. The details of the method is explained in Sec. 3.3.
Table 2 summarizes a comparison between ANN-crafted and SNN-crafted (our
proposed technique) attacks. Note, these are blackbox attacks, i. e., we train
two separate and independently initialized models for each of the 3 networks
(ANN, SNN-conv, SNN-BP). One of them is used as the source (marked as
ANN-I, SNN-conv-I etc.) and the other ones as the target (marked as ANN-II,
SNN-conv-II etc.). It is clear that SNN-BP adversarial accuracy (last row) is the
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Table 2. A comparison of the blackbox adversarial accuracy for ANN-crafted versus
SNN-crafted attacks. ANN-I and ANN-II are two separately trained VGG5 networks
with different initializations. The same is true for SNN-conv and SNN-BP.
FGSM PGD
Target
Source
ANN-I SNN-
conv-I
SNN-
BP-I
ANN-I SNN-
conv-I
SNN-
BP-I
ANN-II 18.9% 32.7% 31.3% 4.7% 31.7% 13.8%
SNN-conv-II 19.2% 33.0% 31.4% 11.6% 32.4% 14.3%
SNN-BP-II 21.5% 38.8% 32.9% 9.7% 43.6% 17.0%
highest for both SNN-crafted and ANN-crafted inputs. Moreover, let us analyze
row 1 of Table 2 for FGSM attack. When ANN-II is attacked by ANN-I, FGSM
accuracy is 18.9%, whereas, if attacked by an SNN-conv-I (or SNN-BP-I), the
accuracy is 32.7% (or 31.3%). Hence, these results suggest that ANN-crafted
attacks are stronger than the corresponding SNN counterparts.
5 Conclusions
The current defense mechanisms in ANNs are incapable of preventing a range of
adversarial attacks. In this work, we show that SNNs are inherently resilient to
gradient-based adversarial attacks due to the discrete nature of input encoding
and non-linear activation functions of LIF (or IF) neurons. The resiliency can be
further improved by reducing the number of timesteps in the input-spike genera-
tion process and increasing the amount of leak of the LIF neurons. SNNs trained
using ANN-SNN conversion technique (with IF neurons) require larger number
of timesteps for inference than the corresponding SNNs trained with spike-based
backpropagation (with LIF neurons). Hence, the latter technique leads to more
robust SNNs. Our conclusion is validated only for gradient-based attacks on deep
VGG and ResNet networks with CIFAR datasets. Future analysis on more di-
verse attack methods and architectures is necessary. We also propose a method
to generate gradient-based attacks from SNNs by using the surrogate gradients.
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Supplementary
SNN-crafted adversarial example
In this section, we develop a technique to produce adversarial examples from a
Spiking Neural Network (SNN) utilizing the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM)
or its iterative variants.
Suppose the source model is referred as M , the loss function of the model for
input x and true labels ytrue, is given by J(x, ytrue). According to FGSM, the
adversarial example is computed as,
xadv = x+ × sign
(∇xJ (x, ytrue) ) (8)
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 denotes the strength of the perturbation. FGSM adversarial examples require
computing the gradient of loss with respect to input (∇xJ(x, ytrue)) obtained
through backpropagation. Hence, it is essential to have a differentiable network
from output all the way to input. However, SNNs have two sources of discon-
tinuity in the gradient: (1) discontinuous gradients of the Leaky-Integrate-Fire
(or Integrate-Fire) neurons in the hidden layers, (2) discretization at the input
layer (Poisson encoding). We circumvent these two obstactles by the following
approximations:
1. The transfer function of LIF (or IF) neuron is a step function, the derivative
being discontinuous at the threshold point. We approximate the gradients of
the neurons by some pseudo-derivatives like linear or exponential functions.
This approach, known as surrogate-gradient technique, is applied to all the
hidden layers, thereby making the network differentiable from output to the
1st hidden layer.
2. At the input layer, continuous-valued analog input is discretized into binary
(0 or 1) spike train. The analog input can be approximated by the average
of this spike train over the entire time-window, referred as the rate input,
Xrate. We assume that Xrate, which is a continuous-valued signal, is the
input to the 1st convolutional layer.
These two approximations make the SNN completely differentiable from out-
put to input. Let us consider an SNN with analog input X and input spike-
train {X1,X2, · · ·XT}, where T is the total number of timesteps. Each of
X1,X2, · · · ,XT has the same dimension as the analog input X. Xrate describes
the timed-average of the spike-train. The output of the 1st convolutional layer
(weight matrix Wconv1) passes through an LIF (or IF) neuron with membrane
potential represented as Xconv1 after T timesteps. We assume that
X ≈ Xrate =
∑i=T
i=1 Xi
T
(9)
and
Xconv1 ≈ Xrate ~Wconv1 (10)
(The validity of the assumption in Eq. 10 is explained in Sec. 5.) Let us assume
the loss function of the network is represented by J . Then the gradient of loss
with respect to input is described using the chain rule of derivative,
∂J
∂X
≈ ∂J
∂Xrate
=
∂J
∂Xconv1
× ∂Xconv1
∂Xrate
(11)
=
∂J
∂Xconv1
~W180rotatedconv1 (12)
where W180rotatedconv1 is the Wconv1 matrix rotated by 180
◦. The proof of Eq. 12
is provided in the next subsection. Hence, FGSM adversarial perturbation is
computed as,
× sign( ∂J
∂X
) ≈ × sign( ∂J
∂Xrate
) = × sign( ∂J
∂Xconv1
~W180rotatedconv1 ) (13)
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∂J
∂Xconv1
is obatined by backpropagating the loss through the network with the
help of the surrogate gradient technique. Then Eq. 13 is used to obtain the ad-
versarial perturbation.
Derivation of ∂J
∂X
when Y = X ~W
Suppose the input image is represented as X, W denotes the weight matrix of
the convolutional layer and Y is the output of the convolution operation.
Y = X~W (14)
Assume X is a 32 × 32 matrix and the kernel size W for convolution is 3 × 3.
Convolution is performed with a padding of 1 and stride of 1. Then output Y
will maintain a size of 32×32 (input dimension+(2×padding)−kernel size+1).
X =

X1,1 X1,2 · · · X1,32
X2,1 X2,2 · · · X2,32
...
...
. . .
...
X32,1 X32,2 · · · X32,32
 ,W =

W1,1 W1,2 W1,3
W2,1 W2,2 W2,3
W3,1 W3,2 W3,3

Y =

0 0 0 · · · 0 0
0 X1,1 X1,2 · · · X1,32 0
0 X2,1 X2,2 · · · X2,32 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
0 X32,1 X32,2 · · · X32,32 0
0 0 0 · · · 0 0

~

W1,1 W1,2 W1,3
W2,1 W2,2 W2,3
W3,1 W3,2 W3,3
 (15)
Y1,1 = W2,2X1,1 +W2,3X1,2 +W3,2X2,1 +W3,3X2,2
Y1,2 = W2,1X1,1 +W2,2X1,2 +W2,3X1,3 +W3,1X2,1 +W3,2X2,2 +W3,3X2,3
...
Y32,32 = W1,1X31,31 +W1,2X31,32 +W2,1X32,31 +W2,2X32,32
Let us assume the loss function is represented by J . The gradient of J with
respect to X is also a 32× 32 matrix, each element described by the chain rule
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of derivative:
∂J
∂X1,1
=
∂J
∂Y1,1
∂Y1,1
∂X1,1
+
∂J
∂Y1,2
∂Y1,2
∂X1,1
+ . . .+
∂J
∂Y32,32
∂Y32,32
∂X1,1
(16)
=
∂J
∂Y1,1
W2,2 +
∂J
∂Y1,2
W2,1 +
∂J
∂Y2,1
W1,2 +
∂J
∂Y2,2
W1,1 (17)
∂J
∂X1,2
=
∂J
∂Y1,1
W2,3 +
∂J
∂Y1,2
W2,2 +
∂J
∂Y1,3
W2,1 +
∂J
∂Y2,1
W1,3 +
∂J
∂Y2,2
W1,2 +
∂J
∂Y2,3
W1,1
(18)
... (19)
∂J
∂X32,32
=
∂J
∂Y31,31
W3,3 +
∂J
∂Y31,32
W3,2 +
∂J
∂Y32,31
W2,3 +
∂J
∂Y32,32
W2,2 (20)
∂J
∂X
=

0 0 0 · · · 0 0
0 ∂J∂Y1,1
∂J
∂Y1,2
· · · ∂J∂Y1,32 0
0 ∂J∂Y2,1
∂J
∂Y2,2
· · · ∂J∂Y2,32 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
0 ∂J∂Y32,1
∂J
∂Y32,2
· · · ∂J∂Y32,32 0
0 0 0 · · · 0 0

~

W3,3 W3,2 W3,1
W2,3 W2,2 W2,1
W1,3 W1,2 W1,1
 (21)
∴ ∂J
∂X
=
∂J
∂Y
~W180rotated, when Y = X~W (22)
Validity of the assumption Xconv1 ≈ Xrate ~Wconv1
In an SNN, the membrane potential Xconv1 at the final timestep T , after passing
through an IF neuron (leak factor λ = 1), is computed as,
Xconv1 =
i=T∑
i=1
(
Xi ~Wconv1 −Vreset,i
)
(23)
Vreset,i is the reset voltage at i-th timestep (in case of soft reset). Xi is the
i-th spike input. Suppose Vthreshold is the threshold voltage of the neuron and
Xconv1,i is the membrane potential at i-th timestep.
Vreset,i =
{
0, if Xconv1,i < Vthreshold
Vthreshold, otherwise
(24)
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Let us assume that the membrane potential reaches threshold n times over the
time-window T .
Xconv1 =
i=T∑
i=1
(
Xi ~Wconv1
)− nVthreshold (25)
= (
i=T∑
i=1
Xi)~Wconv1 − nVthreshold, distributive property of convolution
(26)
= TXrate ~Wconv1 − nVthreshold, T is the total number of timesteps
(27)
Using the chain rule of derivative,
∂J
∂Xrate
=
∂J
∂Xconv1
× ∂Xconv1
∂Xrate
(28)
Assuming the gradient of the second term in Eq. 27 (i.e. ∂(nVthreshold)∂Xrate ) to be
negligibly small, we obtain the gradient of J w.r.t. Xrate from Eq. 22 as,
∂J
∂Xrate
≈ T ( ∂J
∂Xconv1
~W180rotatedconv1 ) (29)
Since T is a positive constant value,
sign(
∂J
∂Xrate
) = sign(
∂J
∂Xconv1
~W180rotatedconv1 ) (30)
which complies with our solution at Eq. 13, obtained from the approximation
Xconv1 ≈ Xrate ~Wconv1.
